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Abstract 
This study analyses the impact of value added tax on key sectoral and macroeconomic 
aggregates, using a CGE model considered suitable for Nigeria. A survey of VATable 
Nigerian manufacturers, distributors, importers and suppliers of goods and services, 
organizations was conducted to gain insights into the way VAT is treated by these 
organizations. The survey shows that a majority of the VATable organizations treat VAT 
in a price cascading manner by regarding it as cost contrary to expectations. Evidence 
from the way VAT revenue is being shared among the three levels of government in 
Nigeria suggests that this revenue is being re-injected into the economy. Against this 
background, model simulations were run for three scenarios. 
The simulation results shows that if VATable organizations treat the VAT in the expected 
non-cascading manner and the VAT revenue is re-injected via increases in sectoral 
government consumption expenditure, the general price level will increase by 5%, total 
private consumption expenditures will fall by over 12%, total consumption expenditure 
inclusive of government component will fall by only 6.7%, total gross output and GDP 
will fall by about 3% and 5% respectively, but the share of wages in total factor income 
will increase lightly. Private savings will increase by over 14% in order to secure the 
savings-investment balance because government and foreign savings will fall by about 
4% and 11.6% respectively. If the VATable organizations treat the VAT in a non-cascading 
manner but the VAT revenue is sterilized the results show that although the price effects 
will be the same, the effects on the other sectoral and macroeconomic aggregates will be 
more deleterious than in the first scenario. Finally, when VAT is treated in a cascading 
manner by the VATable organizations and the VAT revenue is re-injected into the economy 
the price, consumption expenditure, output and income effects will be most deleterious. 
It turns out that this scenario where VAT will have the most adverse effects on price, 
consumption, output, employment and income best approximates the Nigerian situation. 
It will, therefore, be necessary to consider strategies for securing appropriate treatment 
of VAT by the VATable organizations while taking steps to ensure that the VAT revenue 
is targeted at sectors most likely to ameliorate the inadvertent adverse effects of VAT on 
consumer welfare, production, employment and income. 
I. Introduction 
Value added tax (VAT) has become a major source of revenue in many developing 
countries. In sub-Saharan Africa, for example, VAT has been introduced in Benin, Cote 
d'lvoire, Guinea, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Niger, Senegal, Togo and, lately, 
Nigeria. Evidence suggests that in these countries, VAT has become an important 
contributor to total government tax revenues. Shalizi and Squire (1988) find that VAT 
accounted for about 30% of total tax revenues in Cote d'lvoire, Kenya and Senegal in 
1982. The oil producing countries are not excluded from the list of countries introducing 
this tax handle. Tait (1989) shows that VAT has been in effect in Ecuador and Mexico 
since at least 1973, and by 1983 accounted for 12.35% and 19.71% of total government 
revenues in these countries, respectively. Indonesia introduced VAT in 1983 and by 
1988, the ratio of VAT revenue to GDP had risen to 4.5% (Bogetic and Hassan, 1993). 
This impressive performance of VAT in virtually all countries where it has been 
introduced clearly influenced the decision to introduce VAT in Nigeria in January 1994. 
Specifically, the Federal Inland Revenue Service (FIRS) pointed out that VAT is a 
consumption tax that is relatively easy to administer and difficult to evade and it has 
been embraced by many countries world-wide (FIRS, 1993:4). Evidence so far supports 
the view that VAT is already a significant source of revenue in Nigeria. For example, 
actual VAT revenue for 1994 was N8.194 billion, which is 36.5% higher than the projected 
N6 billion for the year. Similarly, actual VAT revenue for 1995 was N21 billion compared 
with the projected N12 billion. In terms of contributions to total federally collected 
revenue, VAT accounted for about 4.06% in 1994 and 5.93% in 1995. For 1996, VAT is 
expected to yield N25 billion and on the basis of past experience, it is quite possible that 
the actual VAT revenue will be much larger. The indication is that Nigeria may soon join 
the growing list of developing countries where VAT contributes at least 20% of total 
government revenue, thereby assisting in the diversification of revenue sources and 
reducing dependence on oil for revenue. 
While the performance of VAT as a source of revenue in these sub-Saharan African 
countries is clearly encouraging, it remains difficult to find attempts to systematically 
assess the impact of VAT on these economies. Nevertheless, policy makers considering 
the adoption of a VAT should be interested in the macroeconomic impact, especially on 
prices, output, income and consumption (Mclure, 1989). This concern over the economy-
wide impact of VAT is all the more important because of the possibility that the tax may 
cause consumers to reduce their consumption of certain commodities that have direct 
and/or indirect effects on labour productivity (Shoup, 1989). 
The primary objective of this study, therefore, is to investigate the likely 
macroeconomic effects of VAT recently introduced in Nigeria to provide a basis for 
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suggesting ways of minimizing the adverse effects while consolidating the beneficial 
ones. Ideally, this type of analysis should have been carried out prior to the introduction 
of VAT in Nigeria as this would have influenced the design and implementation of the 
policy. Still, it is hoped that the insights to be gained from this analysis provide a useful 
guide to the policy makers in their ongoing attempts to fine-tune the policy. 
The inadequacy of a partial equilibrium analysis for this purpose was highlighted by 
Mclure (1989). Specifically, the traditional incidence studies tend to concentrate on the 
issue of who pays the tax, so that the question of who gains or loses from the tax, whose 
income and welfare are reduced or increased, and whose employment opportunity is 
threatened or promoted are not sufficiently considered. In order to consider these issues 
systematically, Mclure (1989) has pointed out that a computable general equilibrium 
(CGE) analysis leads to a more satisfactory analysis of tax policy. This is because a 
CGE model is an economy-wide framework that incorporates the interactions and 
feedback among demand, production and income within which the relevant variables 
adjust until production and consumptions decisions are consistent. Depending on the 
closure rule chosen, such adjustments can take place either through flexible prices under 
full employment or through fixed prices under excess labour and capital, with savings 
adjusting to equalize the nominal value of fixed real investment. See Drud, Grais and 
Pyatt (1985), Rattso (1982), Dewatripont and Michel (1987), and Decaluwe, Martens 
and Monettee (1988) for additional insights into these issues. 
In this paper, therefore, the analysis of the economy-wide effects of VAT in Nigeria is 
done with a computable general equilibrium model considered suitable for the Nigerian 
situation. The disposition of the paper is as follows. In the next section, certain basic 
information about the Nigerian VAT is provided. In order to gain a clearer insight into 
the salient features of VAT in Nigeria as far as its effects on key economic variables are 
concerned, the findings from a quick survey of a cross section of VATable organizations, 
defined to mean all existing manufacturers, distributors, importers and suppliers of goods 
and services, in the Lagos area are presented in Section EI. These features of the Nigerian 
VAT along with certain objective conditions of the Nigerian economy have informed the 
specification of the model presented in Section IV. In Section V, the model simulation 
results are analysed and the last section contains the summary and recommendations for 
further fine-tuning the policy. 
II. Key features of the Nigerian value added 
tax 
According to the Federal Inland Revenue Service (FIRS), the idea of introducing VAT in 
Nigeria originated from the report of a study group set up by the federal government in 
1991 to review the entire tax system. Subsequently, a committee was set up to carry out 
feasibility studies of its implementation. It should be noted that the committee was not 
requested to carry out any analysis of the impact of the tax. Neither was there an active 
debate among the various interest groups such as the organized private sector, labour 
unions and academics as well as other professionals through which certain aspects of the 
impact might have been considered and taken into account in its design and 
implementation. 
Eventually, government agreed to introduce VAT but the actual implementation did 
not commence until January 1994 after the promulgation of the Value-Added Tax Decree 
No. 102 of 1993. According to the decree, a VATable organization is an existing 
manufacturer, distributor, importer or supplier of goods and services. The following are 
the main features of the Nigerian VAT. First, it is a single rate (5%) VAT, which makes it 
easier to administer. Second, it adopts the input-output tax mechanism, which makes it 
self policing. Specifically, although it is a multiple stage tax, it is expected to have a 
single effect on consumer prices and should not add more than the specified rate to the 
consumer price no matter the number of stages at which the tax is paid. In essence, it is 
the official view that the VAT should not be cascading whatsoever since the tax liability 
of a VATable organization is the difference between VAT on output and VAT on inputs. 
In other words, the credit method of collection should eliminate any cascading effects. 
Third, all goods are VATable with the exception of the following: 
9 Medical and pharmaceutical products; 
• Basic food items such as peas, beans, yam, cassava, maize, rice, wheat, milk and 
fish; 
9 Infant food items; 
8 Books, newspapers and magazines; 
9 Educational materials (laboratory equipment); 
9 Baby products such as carriages, clothes and napkins, as well as sanitary towels; 
9 Commercial vehicles and spare parts, tractors, public transport passenger vehicles, 
motorcycles, tanks and other armoured fighting vehicles, and bicycles; 
9 Agricultural equipment such as those for soil preparation or cultivation, harvesting 
or threshing, milking and dairy machinery, and poultry keeping machinery; 
9 Veterinary medicine equipment; and 
9 Fertilizers and farming transportation equipment. 
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Similarly, all services are subject to VAT except: 
8 Medical and health services; 
9 Services by community banks, people's banks and mortgage institutions (interest 
earnings on loans by commercial banks and premiums paid to insurance companies 
are not VATable); 
• Performances conducted by educational institutions as part of learning; 
8 Social services such as orphanages, charities and fire fighting; 
• Pure postal services; 
• Religious services; 
• Non-commercial cultural services; 
• Overseas air transportation; and 
• Public telephone and telegram services (excluding business or commercial services). 
The following other goods and services are also exempted from VAT: salt, water, 
salary or wages from employment, director's emoluments, hobby activities, private 
transactions such as sale of domestic or household articles, vehicles, personal effects or 
private motor vehicles, and residential house rent. For avoidance of doubts, these goods 
and services are exempted from VAT but their inputs are VATable and they cannot claim 
credit for such input taxes. On the other hand, all exports are zero-rated, implying that 
exporters do not collect VAT on exports but they can claim credit for VAT paid on their 
inputs. 
All imports are VATable, whether imported raw materials or finished goods. Moreover, 
VAT on imports is calculated on the total value of the total cost, insurance and freight 
(CIF) plus customs duties and all other charges on imported goods. Amounts expressed 
in foreign currency are converted into naira using the exchange rate adopted by the 
Nigerian Customs Service (NCS). Between January 1994 and August 1995, the NCS 
used the exchange rate prevailing on the date the good was cleared from the ports. In 
this connection, it is recalled that by the beginning of 1995, when the exchange rate 
depreciated by over 70% in the autonomous foreign exchange market (AFEM), the 
organized private sector put enormous pressure on the government to review this procedure 
for computing VAT liability on imports so that by August, the NCS was directed to use 
65% of the prevailing exchange rate on the date of clearance of imports to determine the 
VAT liability on all categories of imports. 
Fourth, with effect from 1 January 1995, all ministries, parastatals and other agencies 
of government as well as religious and other organizations and similar persons that are 
normally exempted from income tax are expected to pay VAT on their consumption in 
addition to the contract price of items consumed by them. For the contractors to render 
monthly returns, all government agencies must obtain receipts from the FIRS for the 
VAT paid on behalf of the contractors. It may be pertinent to mention that this way of 
broadening the base of VAT is consistent with the policy of exemptions, especially the 
provision that all inputs used for the production of VAT exempted goods are themselves 
VATable. 
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Finally, in 1995, the VAT revenue distribution formula was modified as the share of 
federal government increased from 20% to 50%, while the share of the state governments 
decreased from 80% to 25% and the share of local governments increased from 0% to 
25%. However, probably in response to complaints by State Government officials, the 
VAT distribution formula was modified later in the year when the federal government 
share was reduced to 40% while that of state governments was increased to 35%. In 
1996 the share of the federal government was further reduced to 35% while that of the 
state government increased to 40% leaving that of local governments unchanged. 
It should be clear that the Nigerian VAT has a very wide base with relatively few 
exemptions and only exports are zero-rated. Moreover, VAT is not a replacement of any 
of the usual indirect or income taxes. Rather, it replaced the sales tax introduced in 
1986, which had a narrow base and discriminated against locally produced goods and 
services as it excluded imports. The sales tax revenue accrued exclusively to the state 
governments while the VAT revenue is now shared by all levels of government. As such, 
it can be assumed that the VAT revenue is not sterilized but injected through increased 
government final consumption expenditure. Moreover, the VAT is paid on virtually all 
goods and services but the credit system implies that the VAT revenue received by 
government should be devoid of any cascading. In the absence of cascading effects, the 
increase in prices of final goods and services should not be more than the VAT rate of 
5%. 
Meanwhile, there are increasing complaints from various quarters, especially the 
organized private sector, about the effects of the VAT on their operating costs and the 
prices of their products. These complaints about the effects of VAT under a system that 
allows VATable organizations to claim credit for the input VAT suggests that there is 
some problem with the ways the VATable organizations are treating their VAT liabilities, 
especially the VAT they pay on their inputs. 
111. Analysis of survey results 
In order to find out precisely how the VATable organizations are treating their input VAT 
liabilities, a short questionnaire was designed and lodged with 100 VATable organizations 
in the Lagos area in October 1995. The sample was drawn from the list of registered 
VATable organizations as at October 1995, obtained from the Federal Inland Revenue 
Service (FIRS). The listing was arranged by sectors including the date of registration. 
The sample included 30 manufacturing organizations and 70 service organizations all of 
which had registered by March 1994. A total of 70 questionnaires were retrieved by 
January 1996,61 of which were found suitable for analysis. (See Appendix A for a copy 
of the questionnaire.) Of the 61 questionnaires analysed, 21 or 34.4% are in the 
manufacturing sector; the remaining 40 (65.6%) are in the service sectors, ranging from 
financial to business services. Furthermore, 49 of these organizations pay VAT on inputs; 
20 of them are in the manufacturing sector and the remaining 29 are in the service sector. 
Some 36.4% of the responding organizations claimed that the 5% VAT on their inputs 
caused their production cost to increase by over 5% (Table la). Another 38.6% claimed 
that it caused their production cost to increase by just 5%, while 11.4% claimed that the 
input VAT caused their production cost to increase by less than 5%. Notice that only 
13.6% claimed, as expected that the input VAT had no effect on their production cost. 
Clearly, a situation in which 86% of the responding VATable organizations say that the 
VAT on their inputs caused their production cost to increase at all suggests that an 
overwhelming majority of these organizations treat input VAT as a cost. This implies 
that there is some misunderstanding about the efficacy of the credit system of rendering 
VAT returns. Under the credit system, VATable organizations are not supposed to regard 
the VAT on inputs as a cost because they are supposed to deduct these from the VAT 
accruing on outputs and only the balance should be remitted to the VAT office. 
However, earlier in-depth interviews with a few of the VATable organizations indicate 
that input VAT may indeed cause production costs to increase because of the increase in 
working capital associated with the inevitable time lag between the time the input VAT is 
paid and the time the output VAT accrues. And Table lb shows that 62% of the responding 
organizations do claim that input VAT actually caused their working capital requirements 
to increase. Nevertheless, this factor alone is not sufficient to explain the claim by about 
75% of the organizations that input VAT caused their production cost to increase by at 
least 5% (Table la). Therefore, the argument that the system is not properly understood 
by the VATable organizations remains. 
Table lc shows that 76.9% of responding organizations claimed that input VAT caused 
their product prices to increase by at least 5%. This is quite consistent with the results in 
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Table la, indicating the prevalence of markup pricing. Moreover, this result suggests 
that the markup rates are quite high. Table Id showing that over 60% of the organizations 
claimed that input VAT caused the demand for their product to fall suggests that the 
consumers are not completely insensitive to the price increase. On the other hand, the 
fact that 51.2% of the organizations (see Table le) also claimed that the input VAT caused 
their production level to fall suggests that the producers' response was to reduce output 
rather than reduce price in the face of weakening effective demand. The indication is 
that serious market imperfections are prevalent in Nigeria. 
Meanwhile, an overwhelming majority (82%) of the VATable organizations indicated 
that they complied with the credit system in rendering their returns to the VAT office 
(Table If). From Table lg, it is also clear that very few organizations have had occasion 
to successfully request a refund from the VAT office, implying that the VAT accruing on 
output normally exceeds VAT paid on inputs for the majority of the VATable organizations. 
Consequently, the results in tables lh and li should not be surprising. In other words, the 
opinion expressed by about 59% of the responding organizations that VAT has caused 
prices to rise generally by more than 5% is consistent with their own practice. 
Correspondingly, about the same percentage opined that the 5% VAT is too high. 
These results are quite incisive. Foremost, they point to the fact that although the 
VATable organizations deduct the VAT paid on inputs from the VAT accruing on their 
outputs before remitting the balance to the VAT office, they still regard their input VAT 
as cost. Moreover, given the pervasive markup pricing regime, the VAT on inputs is 
magnified by the markup rates, leading to considerable cascading contrary to expectations. 
Finally, although consumers are responding to the price increases by reducing demand, 
producers also respond by reducing output rather than reducing their markup rates in a 
bid to lower prices. The indication is that the markup pricing regime is quite rigid 
downwards, a finding that points to the existence of highly organized producer groups 
that sustain the serious and pervasive market imperfections. As will be seen momentarily, 
these findings have provided useful guides to the model specification presented next as 
well as the simulation exercises analysed subsequently. 
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Table 1: Analysis of the survey of responding VATable organizations In Lagos area of Nigeria, 
1995 
1 a. Effects of input VAT on production cost 
No. % 
Over 5% increase 16 36.36 
Just 5% increase 17 38.64 
Below 5% increase 5 11.36 
No increase 6 13.64 
Total 44 100.00 
Effects of input VAT on working capital requirements 
No. % 
Increased 26 61.90 
Unchanged 16 38.10 
Total 42 100.00 
Effects of input VAT on product prices 
No. % 
Over 5% increase 12 25.53 
Just 5% increase 24 51.06 
Below 5% increase 4 8.51 
No increase 7 14.89 
Total 47 100.00 
Effects of input VAT on demand 
No. % 
Decrease 26 63.41 
No effect 15 36.59 
Total 41 100.00 
Effects of input VAT on production level 
No. % 
Decrease 22 51.16 
No effect 21 48.84 
Total 43 100.00 
Compliance with deduction principle 
No. % 
Yes 36 81.82 
No 8 18.18 
Total 44 100.00 
Firms reporting successful requests for refund of VAT returns 
No. % 
Yes 4 11.43 
No 31 88.57 
Total 34 100.00 
Opinion on effects of VAT on general price level 
No. % 
Over 5% increase 34 58.62 
Just 5% increase 22 37.93 
Below 5% increase 2 3.45 
Total 58 100.00 
Opinion about the VAT rate 
No. % 
Too high 35 57.38 
Adequate 21 34.43 
Too low 5 8.20 
Total 61 100.00 
Source: Survey results. 
IV. The model 
For the present purposes the following main features of the Nigerian VAT system are 
pertinent. First, the VAT is essentially a new tax handle aimed primarily at generating 
additional revenue for government. Second, although it is a consumption tax, there are 
indications of considerable cascading because the VATable organizations treat the input 
VAT as a part of the cost under a generalized markup pricing regime. Third, although 
exports are zero-rated, all goods are subject to VAT, so that prices tend to rise if input 
VAT is treated as cost by the VATable organizations including the exporters. Fourth, all 
manufacturers, distributors, importers and suppliers of VAT exempted goods pay input 
VAT, which is also treated as cost even though they are eligible to seek a refund. 
Turning to the relevant features of the economy, the first important feature is that 
there is already a considerable degree of interdependence in production, and production 
in every sector of the economy depends directly or indirectly on imported intermediate 
inputs. Second, prices are determined on the basis of markups on costs where costs 
include costs of local and imported intermediate inputs, per unit wage cost, depreciation 
allowance, and net indirect taxes. In essence, profit is endogenously determined by 
these costs and the markup rates. In virtually all markets, the suppliers are formally or 
informally organized and one of the most important functions of these suppliers 
associations is indirect price fixing by fixing the markup rates. This situation implies 
that the neoclassical closure rule where prices are flexible both ways, as assumed by 
Bovenberg (1987) in his experiments for Thailand, is not a good approximation of the 
Nigerian situation. 
Model equations 
Against this background, the model equations have been specified and are presented in 
Table 2. As can be seen from the table, the model has the following main blocks: 
• Production and output determination 
8 Price determination 
• Private household transactions 
• Government transactions 
8 External trade 
8 Savings-investment balance 
8 Resource constraints and model closure. 
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P' ' VAT 
n-row vector of nominal per unit wage cost 
n-row vector of nominal per unit indirect taxes on domestically produced goods 
n-row vector of nominal per unit subsidy 
n-vector of real per unit imported intermediate input requirements 
n-row vector of index of prices of imported final goods 
exchange rate index 
n-row vector world price index of imported final goods 
n-row vector of nominal per unit operating surplus (profit) 
index of import duty rate on imported final goods 
VAT rate. 
n-row vector of price index of imported intermediate inputs 
n-row vector of nominal per unit depreciation 
n-row vector world price index of imported intermediate inputs 
n-vector of sectoral expenditure shares 
import duty rate on imported intermediate inputs 
n-row vector of price index of exports 
n-row vector of world price index of exports 
index of export duty tax rate on exports 
private nominal income 
private nominal disposable income 
direct tax rate 
private savings 
nominal private savings rate 
nominal private consumption expenditure 
total nominal government revenue 
total nominal government expenditure 
government savings 
price elasticity of demand for imported final goods 
total nominal foreign savings in domestic currency 
diagonal matrix operator 
n-vector of real VAT induced increase in government consumption expenditure 
government consumption expenditure shares 
real value added revenue 
n-row vector of VAT inclusive sectoral prices 
Suppose that there is excess capacity and there is considerable unemployment. In 
that case, output can be determined by the availability of intermediate inputs, so that the 
operational production function is of the Leontief type. This is the familiar input-output 
balance equation specified in Equation 1, Table 2. 
Price determination 
Analysis of the survey of VATable organizations suggests the prevalence of a markup 
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pricing regime. It has also been found that the producers tend to treat VAT on input as 
costs. Moreover, production, cost and hence prices in Nigeria are affected by the 
availability and cost of imported intermediate inputs. Since these imported inputs are 
also subject to VAT, this attribute must be taken into account in specifying the price 
equation. 
For this purpose, an input-output price equation similar to the one specified in Ajakaiye 
(1985) is considered suitable. Basically, this equation defines sectoral prices as the sums 
of sectoral per unit of domestically produced and imported intermediate input costs, 
wage costs, operating surplus (profit), depreciation, indirect (excise) taxes less subsidies. 
In symbols, this can be written as: 
P =PA+P nc' +w'+r'+d'+t'-s' m 
where: 
P = lxn vector of sectoral prices 
A = nxn matrix of input-output coefficients 
p no _ ] xn vector of sectoral prices of imported intermediate inputs 
H = nxn diagonal matrix of imported intermediate inputs per unit of output 
w' = lxn vector of sectoral per unit wage cost 
r 1 = lxn vector of sectoral per unit profit 
d' = lxn vector of sectoral per unit depreciation 
t' = lxn vector of sectoral per unit indirect taxes 
s' = lxn vector of sectoral per unit subsidies 
Suppose that sectoral prices are determined by the application of markups on costs 
where sectoral costs are defined as the sums of sectoral per unit domestically produced 
and imported intermediate input costs, wage costs, depreciation, indirect (excise) taxes 
less subsidies. In other word, sectoral profit rates are endogenously determined by the 
markup rates and these costs. In symbols, this can be written as: 
r> = c' 
where: 
d = P'A+ P nc' +w' + d' + f -s' 
m 
m = n x n diagonal matrix of sectoral markup rates 
All other variables are as defined earlier. 
So, sectoral prices can be re-written as: 
P' = c'(I + m ) 
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where: I = nxn identity matrix 
All other variables are as defined earlier. 
Suppose that the product type VAT as defined in Zee (1995) is imposed. Then, the 
vector of VAT inclusive sectoral prices can be written as: 
where: 
P'VAT = sectoral prices inclusive of the VAT 
a = VAT rate, which is .05 in Nigeria at present 
All other variables are as defined earlier. 
Clearly, the product-type VAT will cause the sectoral prices to increase by exactly the 
VAT rate (see Equation 2 in Table 2). Recall that the self policing property of the input-
output (multi-stage) VAT mechanism has been adopted in Nigeria. Suppose, as evidence 
strongly suggests in the case of Nigeria, that the VATable organizations treat VAT as a 
cost, then the price equation becomes: 
P'= (P'A + Pm"cl H + w' + d' + t' - s')(I + m) + aP' 
If, as is the case in Nigeria, imported intermediate inputs are also subject to VAT, then 
the price equation becomes: 
P'= (P'A + (l+a)Pmnc' H+w' + d' + f- s')(I + m) + aP' 
From this equation, it is easy to solve for P\ which has been specified in Equation 3, 
Table 2. 
It should be recalled that all categories of imports are subject to VAT. Accordingly, 
the VAT inclusive sectoral prices of imported final goods has been specified in Equation 
4, Table 2. Sectoral prices of imported intermediate inputs and exports are as specified 
in equations 5 and 6 of Table 2, respectively. 
Private household transactions 
In Nigeria, wage rates are generally fixed in nominal terms. This, along with the output 
and producer price determination processes, described above, implies that wages per 
unit of output are also fixed in nominal terms. Define private income as the sum of 
sectoral wages and gross operating surplus (including depreciation allowance), then 
Equation 7 specifies private income. Private disposable income is specified in Equation 
8 in the usual way and private consumption expenditure is the residual of disposable 
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income and private savings. See equations 9 and 10. It is assumed that the typical 
private consumer is maximizing a Cobb-Douglas type utility function from where the 
real sectoral consumption demand specified in Equation 11 can be derived. 
Government transactions 
Government revenue is the sum of direct and indirect taxes as well as VAT on domestically 
produced and imported finished goods as specified in Equation 12. Since the VAT is a 
new revenue generating tax handle, government revenue will increase accordingly. Two 
possibilities exist for government expenditure, depending on the treatment of VAT revenue. 
If VAT revenue is sterilized, real government consumption expenditure will remain 
unchanged. However, its nominal value will increase with increases in sectoral prices 
because of VAT. If, as is the case in Nigeria, VAT revenue is injected into the economy 
via increases in government final consumption expenditure (see Equation 14, Table 2), 
then both real and nominal government consumption expenditures will increase. 
Equations 13 and 14 in Table 2 define government expenditure while Equation 15 defines 
government savings. 
External trade 
Equations 16,17 and 18 define demand for exports, imported inputs and imported final 
goods. The demand for Nigeria's main exports (petroleum and to some extent cocoa) do 
not respond to price changes because Nigeria belongs to the OPEC and ICCO. Hence, it 
is considered reasonable to assume that real exports are fixed. The demand for imported 
intermediate inputs is determined by technology and the level of output. With regard to 
imports of finished goods, although the primary determinant is the import capacity, which 
is itself determined by the export earnings, given the main focus of this study — to 
analyse the impact of VAT via its effects on prices — it is considered reasonable to allow 
imports of finished goods to respond positively to the ratios between sectoral prices of 
domestically produced goods and their imported counterparts. Equation 19 defines foreign 
savings. 
Savings-investment balance 
Since prices are determined on the basis of markups on costs, nominal values of the 
fixed real investment will change with changes in the vector of domestic prices. As a 
result, total nominal investment will increase. In order to finance the nominal value of 
investment, total nominal savings must increase as necessary. Total nominal savings is 
made up of private, government and foreign savings. While government and foreign 
savings are essentially definitional, total private savings is endogenously determined 
and this explains the specification of Equation 7, Table 2. The savings-investment balance 
is as specified in Equation 20. 
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Resource constraints and model closure 
CGE models are generally overdetermined and the way to render the model 
mathematically solvable is referred to as the closure rule. Normally, the choice of closure 
rule has implications for the workings of the model and the qualitative interpretation of 
the simulation results (Drud et al., 1985). It is also important to recognize that the choice 
of model closure rule depends not only on the political and economic considerations but 
also on the nature of the problem at hand (Rattso, 1982; Decaluwe, Martens and Monette. 
1988). In the present circumstance, the pertinent structural features of the Nigerian 
economy as well as the nature of the problem at hand have influenced the choice of 
closure rule. 
As noted earlier, there is excess capacity everywhere in the contemporary Nigerian 
economy; nominal wages are institutionally determined and they are not flexible 
downwards. They can, however, increase as a result of considerations other than increasi ng 
productivity. Observers of the recent events in Nigeria will find that demands for wage 
increases are, invariably, premised on the rising cost of living and hardly on increases in 
labour productivity. Given the level of unemployment in the economy, the various 
increases in remunerations cannot be justified within the neoclassical economics paradigm. 
Moreover, prices of all other goods are rising despite the generally acknowledged 
weakening effective demand, largely because of the institutional factors involved in price 
determination and the influence of costs on these prices. As a result, profits hardly 
reflect the scarcity values of capital since profits really depend on costs and on the mark up 
rates. See Ajakaiye and Ojowu (1994) for further elaborations of this phenomenon in the 
specific case of Nigeria. Finally, the main concern when it comes to the economy-wide 
effects of VAT in Nigeria has to do with the cost-induced increases in prices that arise 
from the way VAT on inputs is treated. Accordingly, it is pertinent to select a closure rule 
that will permit a more realistic analysis of the impact of the tax on the economy via 
changes in prices under alternative treatment of input VAT. 
Against this background, the Kaldorian Closure, where primary factors of production 
are not necessarily paid according to the values of their marginal products and savings, 
adjusts to the nominal value of fixed real investment demand is adopted. See Rattso 
(1982) and Decaluwe, Martens and Monette (1988) for further elaborations on this and 
related issues. Nominal per unit wages are assumed fixed as specified in Equation 21, 
and the excess supplies of labour and capital situations are reflected in equations 22 and 
23, respectively. 
Data and base solution 
The model specified above has been calibrated using Nigerian data for 1991. For this 
purpose, the 29-sector input-output table for 1987 was updated to 1991. Other 
macroeconomic aggregates were obtained from the Federal Office of Statistics and the 
Central Bank of Nigeria. These and other data sets have been combined to produce a 
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1991 SAM for Nigeria (see Table 3). Information on the VAT policy articulation and 
implementation were obtained from the Federal Inland Revenue Service. Insights into 
the way VATable organizations treat VAT on their inputs as well as how they render their 
returns to the FIRS were gained from the analysis of the survey of VATable organizations 
presented in Section III above. 
The model was simulated for the base run, and it was found that the base solution of 
the model replicated the data base as required. Accordingly, the model has been used to 
simulate the impact of VAT on prices and other sectoral and macroeconomic aggregates 
under the alternative treatments of input VAT by the VATable organizations. The 
simulation results are analysed next, beginning with the articulation of the scenarios 
considered in the simulation exercises. 
V. Analysis of simultation results 
Clearly, the impact of VAT on the economy depends critically on the way VATable 
organizations treat the VAT. In the specific case of Nigeria, evidence suggests that the 
VATable organizations are treating the VAT as a cost, in which case the VAT will be 
cascading. In order to assess the influence of this cascading treatment of the VAT on the 
impact of VAT on the economy, it will be necessary to compare these impacts with those 
likely if the VATable organizations had treated the VAT in a non-cascading manner by 
not treating it as cost. The significance or otherwise of the effects of VAT under the two 
scenarios should provide justifications for designing strategies for securing the appropriate 
treatment of VAT by the VATable organizations. 
In order to closely approximate the Nigerian situation, it will be assumed that 
government is pursuing an active fiscal policy involving the re-injection of the VAT via 
increases in government final consumption expenditure under a non-cascading treatment 
of the VAT. These scenarios will be compared with those of a passive fiscal policy, 
where the VAT revenue is sterilized, in order gain insight into the desirability or otherwise 
of sterilizing the VAT revenue. The specific scenarios simulated are as follows: 
• Impact of non-cascading treatment of VAT under active fiscal policy 
• Impact of non-cascading treatment of VAT under passive fiscal policy 
• Impact of cascading treatment of VAT under active fiscal policy 
The simulation results are analysed in the rest of this section. 
Impact of non-cascading treatment of 
VAT under active fiscal policy 
This scenario presupposes that VATable organizations conform with the official 
expectation that the VAT should lead to a once and for all increase in consumer prices 
and that the increase should not exceed the VAT rate. This requires that VATable 
organizations do not treat VAT as costs. Impacts of the 5% VAT, assuming that the 
VATable organizations treat the VAT properly and that government pursues an active 
fiscal policy by which the VAT revenue is injected into the economy via increase in 
government consumption expenditure, are shown in tables 4 and 5. Table 4 shows the 
impact on sectoral prices, private and total consumption expenditures, and gross output. 
A look at column 1 of the table will reveal that all sectoral prices will increase at the VAT 
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rate, i.e., 5%. Columns 2 and 3 of the table show that whereas there will be a generalized 
and almost uniform decline in sectoral private consumption expenditure of over 12%, 
this is not the case for the sectoral total consumption expenditure. For example, total 
private consumption expenditure will decline in only 19 sectors and the increases in total 
private consumption expenditure on goods origination from footwear and leather products, 
paper and paper products, iron and steel, transport, communication and real estate business 
services sectors will be quite substantial. It is significant to note, however, that these 
increases are insufficient to restore the initial level of total consumption, let alone surpass 
it. On the whole, total consumption expenditure will still decline by 6.74%. The 
indication, therefore, is that the re-injection of total VAT revenue into the economy will 
be insufficient to restore the initial level of total consumption expenditure. Moreover, if 
the initial pattern of government consumption expenditure is retained, total final 
consumption expenditure on goods and services originating from sectors that are critical 
to consumer welfare will suffer major setbacks. Prominent among such sectors are 
agriculture, livestock, fishing, food, drinks and beverages, and drugs and chemicals. 
Since the structure of government expenditure can really be a policy tool, this finding 
suggests that the VAT revenue should be allocated to sectors whose outputs are critical to 
the welfare and nutritional status of the people. 
With respect to the impact on output and, hence, employment, column 4 of Table 4 
shows that the level of output will fall in 17 out of the 29 sectors and will rise in the 
remaining 12 sectors. It should be noted that while total consumption expenditure on 
goods originating from other mining and refineries sectors will decline, their gross outputs 
will increase, reflecting the large proportion of the total output of these sectors that is 
delivered to intermediate inputs. 
On the whole, total gross output will fall by about 3% implying that despite the re-
injection of VAT revenues, total output and, hence, employment will still decline compared 
with the initial condition. It is pertinent to draw attention to the indication that output of 
agriculture, livestock, fishing, wood and wood products, other (small-scale) 
manufacturing, distributive trade, hotel and restaurants, and community and personal 
services sectors will be more threatened under this scenario than the other sectors. Since 
these relatively labour intensive sectors harbour the relatively poor and less skilled 
workers, it will be instructive to reallocate the VAT induced increases in government 
consumption expenditure in favour of these sectors. It turns out that doing so will also 
help to improve the welfare and nutritional status of the people. 
In terms of the effects on key macroeconomic aggregates, Table 5 is quite 
revealing. As expected, there will be a 5% increase in the general price index. Given the 
decline in the total consumption expenditure and gross output discussed earlier, it should 
be expected that real wage and profit incomes will fall. However, it should be observed 
that real profit income will fall more than real wage income, Correspondingly, the share 
of wages in total factor income will increase slightly from 12.99% to 13.06%. Thus, if 
VATable organizations were to treat the VAT as expected, there would be some 
improvement in the functional income distribution if the VAT revenue were to be re-
injected into the economy. 
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Table 4: Percentage changes In prices, private and total consumption expenditure, and 
gross output under non-cascading VAT treatment and active fiscal policy 
Activity sectors Price Priv cons Total cons Gross output 
Agriculture 5.00 -12.39 -12.18 -11.22 
Livestock 5.00 -12.39 -12.17 -11.65 
Fishing 5.00 -12.39 -12.39 -12.36 
Forestry 5.00 -12.37 -12.21 -6.12 
Crude petroleum 5.00 -12.39 -9.72 -0.60 
Other mining 5.00 -12.90 -12.90 59.69 
Food 5.00 -12.40 -9.37 -8.43 
Drink bev & tobacco 5.00 -12.37 -9.38 -7.84 
Textiles 5.00 -12.40 9.86 3.04 
Footwear & leather 5.00 -12.25 28.99 5.61 
Wood 5.00 -12.44 -9.80 -18.27 
Paper 5.00 -12.40 38.26 8.78 
Drugs & chem 5.00 -12.38 -3.39 -1.72 
Refineries 5.00 -12.33 -5.44 17.93 
Rubber & plastics 5.00 -12.39 3.59 4.51 
Iron & steel 5.00 - 146.71 160.74 
Fabricated metal 5.00 -12.42 -8.56 -9.53 
Vehicle assembly 5.00 -12.39 -8.46 -8.99 
Other manuf. 5.00 -12.38 -11.16 -10.42 
Utilities 5.00 -12.34 68.51 34.95 
Bldg & constructn 5.00 - 146.66 10.51 
Transport 5.00 -12.34 46.61 5.73 
Communications 5.00 -12.12 17.07 2.34 
Distributive trade 5.00 -12.39 -11.50 -10.13 
Hotel & restrnts 5.00 -12.39 -11.48 -10.66 
Fin. & insurance 5.00 -12.39 -12.18 -9.22 
Real estate & bus.serv 5.00 -10.87 17.86 5.01 
Housing (dwelling) 5.00 -12.40 -6.63 -6.60 
Comty soc. & pers serv. 5.00 -12.38 -12.38 -10.68 
Source: Model simulation results. 
However, this attribute of VAT under an active fiscal policy regime is an empirical 
question because it depends critically on the sectoral distribution of any additional 
government consumption expenditure. Nevertheless, this tendency to redistribute income 
in favour of wage earners can be deliberately secured if the VAT revenue is properly 
targeted at the labour intensive and welfare enhancing sectors. It turns out that deploying 
VAT revenue according to the original structure of government expenditure will result in 
4.73% decline in GDP. 
On the whole, total private income, direct taxes and private disposable income will 
each fall by 4.81% as can be seen from Table 5. However, private savings must rise by 
14.46% in order to finance the higher nominal value of fixed real investment. This is the 
familiar forced savings phenomenon implicit in the Kaldorian closure adopted for this 
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model. As a result, private real consumption expenditure had to fall by as much as 
12.4%. It is significant to note that there will be no major changes in foreign savings 
because the 5% increase in sectoral prices will not elicit a large increase in imports of 
finished goods. Moreover, the foreign savings implications of the increase in imported 
finished goods will be decimated by the reduction in imported inputs because of the fall 
in gross output. 
Although direct tax will fall by 4.81%, total government revenue will increase by 
about 23% because of the VAT revenue. Since the entire VAT revenue is re-injected into 
the system, however, total government consumption expenditure will increase 
phenomenally as shown in Table 5, leaving government savings to decline by 4.08%. 
The upshot of all this is that the 5% VAT, properly treated by the VATable organizations, 
will cause prices to increase by exactly 5% as expected. 
Table 5: Percentage changes in real macroeconomic aggregates under non-cascading VAT 
treatment and active fiscal policy 
Aggregate Change % 
General price index 5.00 
Total gross output -3.04 
Priv. cons. exp. -12.39 
Total cons exp. -6.74 
Exports 0.00 
Total imports -28.93 
FSAV -11.60 
Wage income -4.53 
Operating surplus -5.10 
Total factor income -5.03 
Gross dom. product -4.73 
Total private income -4.81 
Direct taxes -4.81 
Disposable income -4.81 
Private savings 14.46 
Govt revenue 22.99 
Govt cons exp 146.69 
Total govt exp 137.20 
Govt savings -4.08 
Source: Model simulation results. 
If the VAT revenue is re-injected into the system via indiscriminate increases in sectoral 
government consumption expenditure, the likelihood is that the welfare of the people 
may not be restored to its initial level. Employment in certain labour intensive sectors 
may suffer, overall output and employment may fall, and real GDP will also fall. 
Nevertheless, there are indications that functional income distribution may improve 
somewhat. 
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Impact of non-cascading treatment of VAT under passive 
fiscal policy 
This scenario presupposes that VATable organizations conform with the official 
expectations by not treating VAT as costs. Impacts of the VAT when this is combined 
with a passive fiscal policy are shown in tables 6 and 7. From table 6, it can be seen that 
the price effects are exactly the same as before. Column 2 of the Table shows that there 
will be a generalized and virtually uniform decline in private consumption expenditure 
hovering around 8% in each sector. Compared with the situation under the active fiscal 
policy, there is a temptation to conclude that the impact of the VAT under this scenario is 
superior, especially since total private consumption expenditure will fall by 7.83% 
compared with the 12.4% decline under the preceding scenario. However, since real 
government consumption expenditure will remain unchanged under this scenario because 
the VAT revenue is sterilized, total consumption expenditure will fall by about the same 
percentage as the fall in private consumption expenditure. Consequently, the fall in total 
consumption expenditure will be about 7.55%, which is slightly higher than the 6.7% 
fall under the preceding scenario. Correspondingly, there will be a generalized decline 
in all sectoral gross output ranging from 0.29% in the building and construction sector to 
16.3% in the wood and wood products sector. On the whole, total gross output will fall 
by almost 5%, compared with the 3% fall under the preceding scenario. Obviously, 
while the impact of the VAT on private consumption expenditure under this scenario is 
slightly less severe compared with the preceding scenario, the overall effects on total 
consumption, output and, hence, employment are more severe. 
In terms of the effects on macroeconomic aggregates, Table 7 shows that while the 
general price index will increase by 5% and the sterilization of VAT revenue will cause 
total output to fall by almost 5%. Total wage income will fall by about 6.7% and total 
real profit income will fall by about 4.4%. Further analysis of the simulation results 
shows that the share of wage income in total factor income will fall slightly from its 
initial level of 12.99% to 12.72%. The indication is that even when the VATable 
organizations treat VAT properly, if the VAT revenue is sterilized, there is a tendency for 
functional income distribution to worsen. In view of the greater decline in sectoral and 
total gross output, real GDP will also fall by about 4.8%. 
Private income, direct tax and disposable income will fall by about 4.8% each. 
However, private savings will increase by just 3% because the sterilized VAT revenue 
will enable government to contribute directly to total savings, thus reducing the amount 
of private savings necessary to secure savings-investment balance. This explains the 
less deleterious effects of VAT on sectoral private consumption expenditure under this 
scenario. As indicated earlier, since the VAT revenue is sterilized, almost all of the 
increase in government revenue will be passed on to government savings. This explains 
the 27.9% increase in government savings, which reduced the severity of the forced 
savings phenomenon under this scenario. 
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Table 6: Percentage changes In prices, private and total consumption expenditure, and 
gross output under non-cascading VAT treatment and passive fiscal policy 
Activity sectors Price Priv. cons Total cons Gross output 
Agriculture 0.05 -7.82 -7.82 -7.43 
Livestock 0.05 -7.82 -7.82 -7.63 
Fishing 0.05 -7.83 -7.83 -7.82 
Forestry 0.05 -7.87 -7.87 -7.31 
Crude petroleum 0.05 -7.70 -7.70 -1.11 
Other mining 0.05 -9.68 -9.68 -2.01 
Food 0.05 -7.69 -7.69 -6.57 
Drink bev & tobacco 0.05 -7.66 -7.66 -6.40 
Textiles 0.05 -6.72 -6.72 -3.17 
Footwear & leather 0.05 -5.80 -5.80 -2.80 
Wood 0.05 -7.69 -7.69 -16.30 
Paper 0.05 -5.28 -5.28 -5.86 
Drugs & chem 0.05 -7.41 -7.41 -6.41 
Refineries 0.05 -7.49 -7.49 -5.93 
Rubber & plastics 0.05 -7.01 -7.01 -5.42 
Iron & steel 0.05 0.00 0.00 -1.68 
Fabricated metal 0.05 -7.64 -7.64 -7.46 
Vehicle assembly 0.05 -7.64 -7.64 -8.11 
Other manuf. 0,05 -7.75 -7.75 -7.64 
Utilities 0,05 -3.87 -3.87 -5.18 
Bldg & constructn 0.05 0.00 0.00 -0.29 
Transport 0.05 -4.98 -4.98 -6.11 
Communications 0.05 -4.88 -4.88 -6.60 
Distributive trade 0.05 -7.79 -7.79 -7.59 
Hotel & restrnts 0.05 -7.76 -7.76 -7.50 
Fin. & insurance 0.05 -7.82 -7.82 -7.66 
Real estate & bus.serv 0.05 -5.36 -5.36 -6.05 
Housing (dwelling) 0.05 -7.55 -7.55 -7.44 
Comty soc. & pers serv. 0.05 -7.78 -7.78 -7.69 
Source: Model simulation results. 
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Table 7: Percentage changes in real macroeconomic aggregates under non cascading VAT 
treatment and passive fiscal policy 
Aggregate Change (%) 
General price index 5.00 
Gross output -4.97 
Priv. cons exp. -7.83 
Total cons. exp. -7.56 
Exports 0.00 
Total imports -2.26 
Foreign savings -0.91 
Wage income -6.68 
Operating surplus -4.39 
Total factor income -4.69 
Gross dom. product -4.76 
Total private income -4.76 
Direct taxes -4.76 
Disposable income -4.76 
Private savings 3.06 
Govt, revenue 22.47 
Govt cons exp. -0.01 
Total govt exp. -0.43 
Govt savings 27.90 
Source: Model simulation results. 
The indications are that sterilizing the VAT revenue can be more injurious to the 
economy than the situation where the VAT revenue is mobilized and used to increase 
government consumption expenditure. Clearly, the beneficial effects of reduced forced 
savings could not compensate for the effects of generalized decline in private consumption 
expenditure on output and income. What is more, this scenario has the tendency to 
redistribute income in favour of the profit earners. Thus, the welfare and equity 
implications of a properly treated VAT under a passive government fiscal policy are 
likely to be less desirable than the probable outcomes under an active fiscal policy. If the 
VAT revenue is properly targeted at those sectors that have greater impacts on welfare of 
the people, the situation could even be more salutary. 
Impact of cascading treatment of VAT under active fiscal 
policy 
The supposition under this scenario is that the VATabie organizations treat VAT as costs, 
in which case, the VAT has inherent cascading effects on prices. Moreover, it is assumed 
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that the VAT revenue is re-injected into the economy via increase in government 
consumption expenditure. As said earlier, this scenario closely approximates the Nigerian 
situation. Foremost, our survey results show that the VATable organizations actually 
treat the VAT as costs. Furthermore, the 65% of the VAT revenue now being shared 
among the state and local governments will certainly be re-injected into the economy via 
increases in government expenditures. The 35% retained by the federal government is 
expected to be used to cover the cost of administering this tax handle, in which case this 
proportion will also be re-injected into the system. Thus, the impacts of the VAT under 
this scenario should be of particular interest to Nigerian policy makers. 
In this connection, tables 8 and 9 display the impacts of the 5% VAT on the usual 
sectoral and macroeconomic aggregates under this scenario. Beginning with Table 8, 
column 1, it can be seen that treating the VAT as costs has horrendous cascading effects 
on all sectoral prices. Price increases in all other sectors except the finance and insurance 
will rise by more than 10%. Moreover, notice that unlike the preceding scenarios, the 
price increases are not uniform, explaining the variations in the decreases in sectoral 
private consumption expenditures. From column 2 of Table 8, it can be seen that there 
are relatively large decreases in private consumption expenditures, with the lowest being 
11% and the highest 19.98%. 
Column 3 of the table, however, shows that the increase in government consumption 
expenditures not only reduced the severity of the fall in total consumption expenditure 
but it actually swamped it in nine sectors. Thus, while total private consumption 
expenditure fell precipitously by 16.04%, total consumption expenditure fell by 10.64%. 
Clearly, this is still very high compared with the first scenario. The indication is that 
private and total consumption expenditure will fall more precipitously if VAT is treated 
as cost, the re-injection of VAT revenue notwithstanding. It may be impossible to redress 
the situation effectively even if the re-injection is targeted in the best way possible. 
Correspondingly, there will be large decreases in sectoral gross outputs although this 
will not be universal. As shown in Table 8, column 4, gross output will, in fact, increase 
in crude petroleum, textiles, footwear and leather products, paper and paper products, 
iron and steel, utilities, building and construction, transport, communications and real 
estate and business services sectors. It should be recalled that these are the same sectors 
that are shown to have increases in gross output under the first scenario. Thus, the same 
explanations apply. On the whole, total gross output will still fall by 6.25%, which is 
more than double the decline shown under the first scenario. 
Turning to the effects on key macroeconomic aggregates, Table 9 shows that the 
general price index will increase by 12%, reflecting the high degree of cascading. The 
consequent decreases in private and total consumption expenditures as well as output 
have been discussed. 
Wage and profit incomes will fall rather precipitously by 8.54% and 12.27%, 
respectively. Further analysis of the results show, however, that the share of wage income 
in total factor income will increase from its initial level of 12.99% to 13.47%. 
Nevertheless, the rather sharp decreases in both components of total factor income are 
likely to mask this desirable development. This is especially so because it is doubtful if 
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the situation can be redressed significantly through targeting of the VAT revenue. Overall, 
real GDP will decline by 11.34%. 
Under this scenario, private income, direct taxes and private disposable income will 
each fall by 11.44%. A significant development is the relatively small change in private 
savings despite the fact that government savings declined as expected. The explanation 
for this phenomenon lies in the increased foreign savings warranted by the 6.85% increase 
in imports. Recall that imports of finished goods are expected to respond positively to 
the ratio between domestic and import prices. Given the high domestic prices, the 
consequent increase in imported final goods swamped the decline in imported intermediate 
inputs. Foreign savings increased as a result, thus reducing the pressure for increased 
private savings. Nevertheless, real private savings rate still increased by about 4% to 
reach 31% under this scenario. 
As expected, the decreases in direct and indirect taxes were swamped by the increase 
in VAT revenue so that government revenue increased by 16.08%. However, since all of 
the VAT revenue is mobilized, government savings actually fell by about 12% as shown 
in Table 9. 
The indication is that the situation whereby VAT is treated as cost by the VATable 
organizations poses a great threat to the sustainability of VAT in a developing economy 
like Nigeria's despite its high revenue potential. If a 5% VAT under this scenario can 
cause a 12% increase in the general price index, little wonder why the 17% VAT had to 
be withdrawn in Ghana. More worrisome is the indication that the declines in 
consumption, output and income are so large that it is doubtful if these effects can be 
significantly addressed through appropriate targeting of the VAT revenue. There is, 
therefore, a strong motivation to consider carefully the strategies likely to effectively 
secure the appropriate treatment of the VAT by the VATable organizations. In addition, 
while the current situation whereby VAT revenues are re-injected into the system is 
basically appropriate, care must be taken to target the VAT revenue effectively in ways 
that will redress the welfare and equity problems the VAT tends to raise, especially since 
VAT will lead to increases in prices under the best possible treatment by the VATable 
organizations. Some recommendations for this are contained in the next section. 
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Table 8: Percentage changes In prices, private and total consumption expenditure, 
and gross output under cascading VAT treatment 
Activity sectors Price Privcons Total cons Gross output 
Agriculture 13.00 -16.41 -16.21 -15.23 
Livestock 17.00 -19.90 -19.69 -18.95 
Fishing 11.00 -15.36 -15.36 -15.37 
Forestry 15.00 -18.37 -18.20 -12.61 
Crude petroleum 11.00 -15.06 -12.39 -1.28 
Other mining 17.00 -19.35 -19.35 49.65 
Food 15.00 -18.09 -15.11 -14.12 
Drink bev & tobacco 11.00 -14.98 -12.01 -10.48 
Textiles 12.00 -15.72 6.43 1.23 
Footwear & leather 13.00 -16.67 24.28 2.32 
Wood 14.00 -17.70 -15.06 -40.74 
Paper 13.00 -16.67 33.51 4.15 
Drugs & chem 15.00 -18.46 -9.65 -8.08 
Refineries 15.00 -17.79 -10.97 9.94 
Rubber & plastics 13.00 -16.78 -0.90 -0.05 
Iron & steel 15.00 138.03 135.40 
Fabricated metal 14.00 -17.41 -13.70 -14.66 
Vehicle assembly 17.00 -19.35 -15.50 -19.35 
Other manuf. 13.00 -16.98 -15.77 -14.98 
Utilities 11.00 -15.11 65.79 29.95 
Bldg & constructn 12.00 142.50 9.96 
Transport 12.00 -15.82 42.83 0.86 
Communications 10.00 -15.15 14.63 -1.70 
Distributive trade 11.00 -14.98 -14.09 -13.06 
Hotel & restmts 14.00 -17.74 -16.88 -15.86 
Fin. & insurance 9.00 -13.49 -13.28 -10.89 
Real estate & bus.serv 11.00 -15.22 14.29 0.74 
Housing (dwelling) 18.00 -19.98 -14.35 -13.01 
Comty soc. & pers serv. 13.00 -16.53 -16.53 -15.07 
Source: Model simulation results. 
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Table 9: Percentage changes in real macroeconomic aggregates under 
cascading VAT treatment and active fiscal policy 
Aggregate Change (%) 
General price index 12.00 
Total gross output -6.25 
Priv. cons, exp. -16.04 
Total cons exp. -10.36 
Exports -1.06 
Total imports 6.85 
FSAV 4.24 
Wage income -8.54 
Operating surplus -12.27 
Total factor income -11.79 
Gross dom. product -11.34 
Total private income -11.44 
Direct taxes -11.44 
Disposable income -11.44 
Private savings 0.25 
Govt revenue 16.08 
Govt cons exp 143.85 
Total govt exp 134.22 
Govt savings -11.92 
Source: Model simulation results. 
VI. Summary and recommendations 
Summary 
In this study, the impact of VAT on key sectoral and macroeconomic aggregates has been 
analysed using a CGE model considered suitable for Nigeria. A survey of VATable 
organizations in Nigeria was conducted to gain insights into the way they treat VAT. 
This was necessary because the impacts of VAT on the economy depend critically on 
whether or not VAT has cascading effects on prices. 
Analysis of the survey results show that the majority of the VATable organizations 
treat VAT in a price cascading manner by regarding it as cost, contrary to expectations. 
Evidence from the way VAT revenue is being shared among the three levels of government 
in Nigeria suggests that this revenue is being re-injected into the economy. These findings 
provided useful guides to the specification of the model, especially the price formation 
and government expenditure aspects as well as the choice of closure rule. The findings 
also provided guides to the articulation of the three scenarios simulated; these scenarios 
were: 
• Impact of non-cascading treatment of VAT under active fiscal policy 
8 Impact of non-cascading treatment of VAT under passive fiscal policy 
• Impact of cascading treatment of VAT under active fiscal policy 
Analysis of the simulation results can be summarized as follows. Foremost, if VATable 
organizations treat the VAT in the expected non-cascading manner, all sectoral prices 
and the general price level will increase by 5%, the amount of the tax. However, the 
impacts on other key economic variables such as consumption expenditure, output (and, 
hence, employment), factor income and its functional distribution, and private, government 
and foreign savings depend critically on the prevailing fiscal policy as far as the 
deployment of VAT revenue is concerned. 
Analysis of the simulation results when VAT is treated in a non-cascading manner 
and the VAT revenue is re-injected into the economy via increases in sectoral government 
consumption expenditure showed that sectoral private consumption expenditure will fall 
uniformly by about 12%. However, the injection of VAT revenue will abate the deleterious 
effects of the VAT on sectoral total consumption in all sectors, while swamping it in 10 
sectors. Overall, while total private consumption expenditures will fall by over 12%, 
total consumption expenditure inclusive of government will fall by only 6.7%. Gross 
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output and GDP will fall by about 3% and 5% respectively, but the share of wages in 
total factor income will increase slightly. Private savings will increase by over 14% in 
order to secure the savings-investment balance because government and foreign savings 
will fall by about 4% and 11.6% respectively. 
The model simulating the supposition that the VATable organizations treat the VAT in 
a non-cascading manner with the VAT revenue sterilized, shows that although the price 
effects will be the same, the effects on the other sectoral and macroeconomic aggregates 
will be more deleterious than in the first scenario. The indication is that if VATable 
organizations treat VAT as expected, the impacts on consumption, output and income 
will be less deleterious if the VAT revenue is re-injected into the economy via increases 
in government consumption expenditure provided that there is considerable excess 
capacity in most sectors of the economy. 
Finally, when VAT is treated in a cascading manner by the VATable organizations and 
the VAT revenue is re-injected into the economy, the price, consumption expenditure, 
output and income effects will be most deleterious. What is more, the VAT revenue 
under this scenario will be lower than under the first scenario by more than 3%. Therefore, 
while it may be possible to ameliorate, if not eliminate, the adverse effects of VAT under 
a non-cascading treatment by properly targeting the re-injected VAT revenue, doing so 
will certainly be more difficult if VAT is being treated in a cascading manner. It turns out 
that this scenario, where VAT will have the most deleterious effects on price, consumption, 
output, employment and income, best approximates the Nigerian situation. It will, 
therefore, be necessary to consider strategies for securing appropriate treatment of VAT 
by the VATable organizations while taking steps to ensure that the VAT revenue is targeted 
at sectors most likely to ameliorate the inadvertent adverse effects of VAT on consumer 
welfare, production, employment and income. 
Recommendations 
First, there is need to take steps to secure appropriate treatment of VAT by the VATable 
organizations in Nigeria. Towards this end, it will be necessary to embark on massive 
enlightenment campaigns targeted at these organizations and their customers to sensitize 
them to the desirable treatment of the 5% VAT and its price implications under the credit 
system. The VATable organizations could be reached through various private sector 
organizations and associations. Prominent among these are: 
• The National Association of Chambers of Commerce, Industries, Manufacturing, 
Mining and Agriculture (NACCIMMA) 
• The Manufacturers Association of Nigeria (MAN) 
• National Employers Consultative Associations (NECA) 
9 National Association of Road Transport Owners Association (NARTO) 
• National Association of Small-Scale Industrialists (NASSI) 
8 Market ssociations in the major markets all over the country 
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More substantively, the VATable organizations should be encouraged to publicize the 
recommended retail prices of their products or services, clearly indicating the pre-VAT 
and VAT-inclusive retail prices. In addition, the FIRS should design incentives for 
appropriate treatment of VAT by the VATable organizations. For this purpose, external 
auditors could be required to verify and report on the treatment of VAT by the VATable 
organizations. Setting up the proposed Federal Consumer Protection Council and State 
Consumer Protection Committees to monitor costs and prices and ensure that VATable 
organizations are treating the VAT appropriately should be explored. 
Analysis of the simulation exercises also suggests that even if the VATable 
organizations treat VAT in a non-cascading manner, the impacts of the inadvertent price 
increases on consumption expenditures, production, employment and income are quite 
deleterious. While the adverse effects on these variables are generally less severe if the 
VAT revenue is re-injected, these adverse effects can be further ameliorated if the VAT 
revenue is properly targeted. In the Nigerian case, it is recommended that the federal, 
state and local governments should target their VAT induced increases in government 
expenditures at activities that will reduce operational constraints to the agricultural sector 
(including livestock and fishing) as well as the manufacturing sector, especially the food, 
drinks and beverages, footwear, textiles, drag and chemical subsectors. These are the 
sectors likely to suffer major setbacks if the VAT revenue is indiscriminately injected 
into the system. It turns out that targeting the VAT induced increases in government 
expenditure this way will ameliorate the effects of the unavoidable price increases on 
consumer welfare, nutritional status of the people, production, employment and income. 
It must be emphasized that failure to address these inadvertent adverse effects of VAT 
will decimate its overall benefits to the economy and, indeed, threaten its sustainability, 
especially if an increase in the VAT rate is contemplated. Presumably, it is the relatively 
low VAT rate and the fact that VAT is just one of the several cost escalating policies that 
have been obscuring these adverse effects so far. Clearly, if government had accepted 
the proposal to set the VAT rate at a higher level, these problems could have been more 
visible and the associated resistance might have warranted its withdrawal as was the 
case in Ghana. 
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Appendix A 
NIGERIAN INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RESEARCH 
RM.B. 5, U. I. POST OFFICE, IBADAN 
IMPACT ASSESSMENT OF VALUE ADDED TAX 
The Federal Government of Nigeria introduced a 5% value added tax (VAT) with effect from 
January, 1994. Since then, the tax handle has been seen as a veritable source of revenue for the 
Government. Nevertheless, there have been complaints by the various organizations regarding 
its impact suggesting that the policy may be having certain adverse effects. It is the intention of 
this study to assess the benefits and costs of the policy in Nigeria with a view to advising 
Government on the appropriate complementary policies necessary to minimize the cost and 
maximize the benefits. 
Your organization has been identified as one of the major VATable organizations in the country 
and you are hereby requested to please assist in completing the attached questionnaire. 
Thanks for your cooperation. 
Prof. Olu Ajakaiye 
Code: / / / / / / I I I I I 
(for office use only) 
1.1 Name of Establishment: 
1.2 Address of Physical Location: 
1. Street and Number: 
2. Town: 3. Local Govt. Area 
4. State: 5. Telephone: 
1.3 Mailing Address: (If different from item 2) 
1. Street and Number: 
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2. Town: 3. Local Govt. Area 
4. State: 5. P.O. Box/P.M.B 
1.4 Type of Economic Organization: 
Is this establishment one of many business owned or controlled by one company? 
(Tick one box) 
U Yes l_l No 
If 'Yes' continue below, otherwise go to item 1.7 
1.5 Name of Headquarters/Owning Company: 
1.6 Address of Physical Location: 
1. Street and Number: 
2. Town: 3. Local Govt. Area 
4. State: 5. Telephone: 
1.7 Type of Legal Organizations (Tick one box) 
1. / / Sole Proprietorship 5. / / Co-operative 
2.1_l Partnership 6. L_l Statutory Corporation 
(Parastatal) 
3. / / Public Limited Co. 7. / / Govt. Owned Company 
4. /_/Private Limited Co. 8. /__/ Others (specify) 
ARE YOU A REGISTERED VATABLE ORGANIZATION? (Tick one) 
U Yes U No 
IF YES, PLEASE INDICATE YEAR OF REGISTRATION (Tick one) 
/_/ 1994 U 1995 
DO YOU PAY THE 5% VAT ON YOUR INPUTS? (Tick one) 
U Yes U No 
M A C R O E C O N O M I C E F F E C T S OF V A T IN N I G E R I A 4 1 
IF YOU PAY VAT ON YOUR INPUTS, HOW HAS THE 5% VAT AFFECTED YOUR 
PRODUCTION COST? (tick one) 
1. caused cost of production to increase by 5% LJ 
2. caused cost of production to increase by more than 5% /_/ 
3. caused cost of production to increase by less than 5% /__/ 
4. caused cost of production to remain the same LJ 
5. caused cost of production to decrease by about 5% LJ 
6. caused cost of production to decrease by more than 5% LJ 
7. caused cost of production to decrease by less than 5% LJ 
IF YOU PAY VAT ON YOUR INPUTS, HAS THE 5% VAT CAUSED AN INCREASE IN YOUR 
WORKING CAPITAL REQUIREMENT? (Tick one) 
U Yes u No 
IF THE VAT HAS CAUSED YOUR COST TO INCREASE, PLEASE RANK THE FOLLOWING 
COMPONENTS OF THE 5% VAT ON YOUR INPUTS ACCORDING TO THEIR 
SIGNIFICANCE AS CONTRIBUTORS TO YOUR COST (Tick as appropriate) 
COMPONENTS VERY SIGNIFICANT NOT 
SIGNIFICANT SIGNIFICANT 
VAT ON IMPORTED RAW MATERIALS 
VAT ON LOCAL RAW MATERIALS 
VAT ON UTILITIES 
VAT ON FINANCIAL SERVICES 
VAT ON OTHER SERVICES 
IF YOU PAY VAT ON YOUR INPUTS, HOW HAS THIS AFFECTED YOUR PRODUCTION 
LEVEL? (Tick one) 
1. caused production level to increase LJ 
2. caused production level to decrease LJ 
3. has had no effect on production level LJ 
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IF YOU PAY VAT ON YOUR INPUTS, HOW HAS THE 5% VAT AFFECTED THE PRICES 
OF YOUR PRODUCTS? (Tick one) 
1. caused the product prices to increase by 5% (_J 
2. caused the product prices to increase by more than 5% LJ 
3. caused the product prices to increase by less than 5% /_/ 
4. caused the product prices to remain the same LJ 
5. caused the product prices to decrease by about 5% LJ 
6. caused the product prices to decrease by more than 5% LJ 
7. caused the product prices to decrease by less than 5% /_/ 
DO YOU ALSO CHARGE VAT ON YOUR PRODUCTS? (Tick one) 
U Yes [_/ No 
IF YOU CHARGE 5% VAT ON YOUR PRODUCTS, HOW HAS THIS AFFECTED YOUR 
PRODUCT PRICES? 
1. caused the product prices to increase by another 5% 
2. caused the product prices to increase by more than 5% 
3. caused the product prices to increase by less than 5% 
4. caused the product prices to remain the same 
5. caused the product prices to decrease by about 5% 
6. caused the product prices to decrease by more than 5% 
7. caused the product prices to decrease by less than 5% 
IF YOU CHARGE THE 5% VAT ON YOUR PRODUCTS HOW HAS THIS AFFECTED 
DEMAND FOR YOUR PRODUCTS (Tick one) 
1. caused the demand to increase 
2. caused the demand to decrease 
3. has had no effect on demand 
l_l 
U 
M A C R O E C O N O M I C E F F E C T S OF V A T IN N I G E R I A 4 3 
IF YOU PAY VAT ON YOUR INPUTS AND CHARGE VAT ON YOUR OUTPUT DO YOU 
NORMALLY DEDUCT THE VAT PAID ON YOUR INPUT FROM THE VAT CHARGED ON 
YOUR PRODUCTS AND FORWARD THE BALANCE TO VAT OFFICE? (Tick one) 
U Yes U No 
IF YES, HAVE YOU EVER HAD TO SUCCESSFULLY REQUEST FOR A REFUND FROM 
THE VAT OFFICE? (Tick one) 
U Yes U No 
IF YES, WAS THE REFUND WORTH THE EFFORT? (Tick one) 
U Yes u No 
IF NO, WHY NOT 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
IF YOU PAY VAT ON YOUR INPUTS BUT YOU DO NOT CHARGE VAT ON YOUR 
PRODUCTS DO YOU REGULARLY REQUEST FOR A REFUND FROM THE VAT OFFICE? 
(Tick one) 
U Yes u No 
IF YES, HAVE YOU ALWAYS RECEIVED THE REFUND FROM THE VAT OFFICE? (Tick 
one) 
U Yes u No 
IF YES, WAS THE REFUND WORTH THE EFFORT? (Tick one) 
U Yes u No 
IF NO, WHY NOT? 
1 
2 . 
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3 
4 
5 
WHAT IS YOUR OPINION ABOUT THE IMPACT OF THE 5 % VAT ON PRICES IN NIGERIA? 
(Tick one) 
1. IT HAS CAUSED PRICES TO INCREASE BY MORE THAN 5% U 
2. IT HAS CAUSED PRICES TO INCREASE BY JUST 5% /__/ 
3. IT HAS CAUSED PRICES TO INCREASE BY LESS THAN 5% U 
WHAT IS YOUR OPINION ABOUT THE 5% VAT? (Tick one) 
l . IT IS TOO HIGH LJ 
2. IT IS QUITE ADEQUATE LJ 
3. IT IS TOO LOW l_ l 
Name of Responding Officer: 
Title of Responding Officer: 
AFRICAN ECONOMIC RESEARCH CONSORTIUM 
P.O. BOX 62882 
NAIROBI, KENYA 
TELEPHONE (254-2) 228057 
225234 215898 212359 
332438 225087 
TELEX 22480 
FAX (254-2) 219308, 246708 
E-MAIL: 
aercpub@fonn-net.com 
WEB SITE: 
http://www.aercafrica.org 
T h e principal objective of the African Economic Research 
Consortium (AERC), established in August 1988, is to 
strengthen local capacity for conducting independent, rigorous 
inquiry into problems pertinent to the management of 
economies in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
In response to special needs of the region, AERC has 
adopted a flexible approach to improve the technical skills of 
local researchers, allow for regional determination of research 
priorities, strengthen national institutions concerned with 
economic policy research, and facilitate closer ties between 
researchers and policy makers. 
Since its establishment, AERC has been supported by 
private foundations, bilateral aid agencies and international 
organizations. 
SPECIAL PAPERS contain the findings of commissioned 
studies in furtherance of AERC's programmes for research, 
training and capacity building. 
RESEARCH PAPERS contain the edited and externally 
reviewed results of research financed by the AERC. 
It is AERC's policy that authors of Special and Research 
Papers are free to use material contained therein in other 
publications. Views expressed in the Special and Research 
Papers are those of the authors alone and should not be 
attributed to the AERC's sponsoring Members, Advisory 
Committee, or Secretariat. 
Further information concerning the AERC and additional 
copies of Special and Research Papers can be obtained by 
writing to: African Economic Research Consortium, P.O. Box 
62882, Nairobi, Kenya. 
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